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Abstract 
 
Using an equilibrium model of inter-linked frictional labour and marriage markets, we establish 
the existence of male marriage premium within a given productivity group, as well as a clear 
ranking of premia across different groups. We find supporting evidence using Chinese data. 
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1 Introduction
Married men earn, on average, more than single men: the male marriage wage
premium has consistently been found to be anywhere between 10% and 50%.
Interestingly, the female marital earnings gap tends to be negative and much
smaller. Noticing this startling asymmetry, Bonilla and Kiraly (2013) and
Bonilla et al. (2019) show that the male marriage gap can be an equilibrium
outcome in a model of inter-linked frictional labour and marriage markets where
men are viewed as ”breadwinners” in the family.
Here, we first extend the original framework by introducing male productiv-
ity heterogeneity. This allows us to obtain a clear prediction about the ranking
of marriage wage premia across productivity types. We then carry out an em-
pirical investigation of our theory.
The search-theoretic explanation of marriage premium is quite intuitive. If
women only accept partners with high enough wages, the sequential job search
of unemployed single men is constrained by expectations in the marriage market,
and this affects their reservation wage strategy. In particular, if the required
well-paid jobs are difficult to encounter, unemployed single men may be prepared
to accept wages that make them unmarriageable, so those who end up getting
married are the men who are simply lucky to land jobs with higher wages.
There is a subtle but important difference between our assumptions and
the so-called selection hypothesis,1 according to which women tend to marry
men with personal traits that happen to be both productivity-enhancing in the
labour market and valued in the marriage market. In contrast, we consider
direct selection into marriage based on wage. Grossbard-Shechtman and Neu-
man (2003) argue that the selectivity effect could be a breadwinner effect, while
Ludwig and Bru¨derl (2018) provide recent empirical evidence of selection into
marriage on wage levels and growth.
Furthermore, existing empirical studies rarely look at marriage premia within
particular groups of men, and the selection hypothesis itself has nothing to say
about potential wage gap patterns across such groups. By sampling men of
similar productivity (proxied by education), and applying standard fixed effects
methods we reduce the scope for selection into marriage based on heterogeneous
correlated traits. Not only do we find evidence of marriage premia within each
group, but we also obtain estimates that confirm the marriage premium patterns
across productivity groups, as suggested by our theory.
2 Theoretical model and results
We consider a steady state economy with a continuum of risk neutral women
and men. Time is continuous and agents discount the future at rate r.
1See Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (2003) for a survey of the selection literature.
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Men enter the economy unemployed and single. They use costless random
sequential search in the labour market, locating jobs at rate λ0. Men differ
in terms of productivity, with subscript i (= L,H) denoting low- and high
productivity types, respectively. We model this heterogeneity by assuming that
a type i unemployed draws an offer from an exogenous wage distribution Fi(w)
with support [wi, wi], where FH(w) first-order stochastically dominates FL(w),
and wL < wH , wL < wH . A single man employed at wage w has flow payoff
w, constant through his lifetime as there is no on-the-job search. All single
men look for female partners, who can observe a man’s employment status,
his productivity and earned wage (if any). In the marriage market, contact
occurs according to a quadratic matching function, with λ denoting the meeting
efficiency parameter. A married man earning wage w enjoys flow payoff w + y,
where y > 0 captures the utility of marriage.
Let n denote the measure of single women, all of whom have an exogenous
flow payoff x. Women do not look for jobs, but use costless random sequential
search to locate single males. Upon contact, a woman decides whether to ac-
cept or reject a marriage proposal. Once married, a woman gives up x, and her
flow payoff becomes her partner’s wage, with x < wL, so all marriages are effi-
cient. Blundell et al. (2016) show that female attachment to the labour market
weakens considerably after marriage. Gould and Paserman (2003) and others
provide evidence that women build this into their expectations and behaviour
in the marriage market.
Marriages are for life (there is no divorce), but couples and singles alike leave
the economy at an exogenous rate δ. A new single woman enters the economy
every time a single woman gets married or exits. We focus on the scenario
where women do not marry unemployed men.2 Every time a type i unemployed
single man accepts a job or exits, he is replaced by another type i unemployed
single man, hence the steady state measures of unemployed (ui) can be treated
as exogenous.
Since the value of being a single woman is constant while the value of mar-
riage is increasing in her partner’s wage, the optimal search strategy of females
has the reservation property. Let WS denote the value of being a single woman,
WMi the value of being married to a type i employed man, and Ti the respective
female reservation wages. Then, standard arguments lead to:
(r + δ)WS = x+
λuHλ0
(λn+ δ)
wH∫
TH
[
WMH (w)−WS
]
dFH(w)+
+
λuLλ0
(λn+ δ)
wL∫
TL
[
WML (w)−WS
]
dFL(w).
2The scenario where they do is not interesting - see Bonilla et al. (2019)
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Female reservation wages are implicitly given by WS = WMH (TH) = W
M
L (TL).
Crucially, here we have WMH (w) = W
M
L (w) = w/(r+ δ) since, once employed, a
man’s type is irrelevant for a woman. It follows immediately that TH = TL ≡ T ,
so all men face the same constraint in the marriage market.
Unemployed single men are therefore involved in a so-called constrained se-
quential search. This decision problem was derived in detail by Bonilla et al.
(2019). There, male types denote something other than productivity, so distri-
bution functions are not type-dependent, as they are here. With that being the
only difference for men’s decision problem, one can show that in any equilibrium
where the marriage market affects the jobs search of all men (i.e wH < T < wL),
the reservation wage functions are continuous and piecewise differentiable, with:
(i) Ri(T ) = T for T ∈ (Ri, T̂i], where
Ri =
λ0
r + δ
 wi∫
Ri
[1− Fi(w)] dw
 and
T̂i =
λ0
r + δ
 wi∫
T̂i
[1− Fi(w)] dw + [1− Fi(T̂i)]λn
r + δ + λn
y
 (> Ri)
(ii) Ri(T ) < T and decreasing in T for T ∈ (T̂i, wi), where
Ri(T ) =
λ0
r + δ
[∫ wi
Ri(T )
[1− Fi(w)] dw + [1− Fi(T )]λn
r + δ + λn
y
]
(< T )
(iii) Ri(T ) = T for T = wi.
For relatively low female reservation wages, men refuse jobs that preclude
marriage. There is a threshold female reservation wage (T̂i) such that a further
increase in this wage results in a decrease in the male reservation wage: un-
employed men now choose to accept wages below T and therefore potentially
jeopardise their marriage prospects. For higher and higher female reservation
wages men react by relying more and more on luck for landing jobs that permit
marriage.
Crucially, while in Bonilla et al. (2019) the male types have the same reser-
vation wage function, here the optimal job search strategies of unemployed
men differ due to the separate wage distributions. In particular, here we have
RH > RL and T̂H > T̂L, so high productivity men have a higher pure labour
market reservation wage and they give up on the marriage market later than the
less productive men, simply because FH(w) stochastically dominates FL(w).
In equilibrium, the female reservation wage gives rise to two best responses
R∗i . These male reservation wages determine average earned wages, and their
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position relative to T determines the size of the marriage wage gap. We define
the marriage premium among type i men (MPi) as the difference between the
average wage of type i married men and the average wage of type i single men.
Denoting these average wages by w˜Mi and w˜
S
i , we have MPi ≡ w˜Mi − w˜Si , and
are ready to state our main theoretical result:
Proposition 1 MPH ≤MPL.
Proof. Computing MPi follows Bonilla et al. (2019). If T ∈ [Ri, T̂i], then
R∗i = T and w˜
M
i = w˜
S
i , so MPi = 0. In contrast, if T ∈ (T̂i, wi), then R∗i < T
and w˜Mi > w˜
S
i , so MPi > 0, which is increasing in T −R∗i . Since RH > RL and
T̂H > T̂L, our main result follows.
When unemployed men choose to match the female reservation wage, all
employed men get married and hence there is no male marriage premium. In
contrast, when unemployed men are willing to accept wages lower than the
female reservation wage, only those who still land a sufficiently high wage get
married. The marriage premium is now the wedge between the average wage of
these lucky men and that of their unlucky comrades.
A corollary of the above is that for any number of productivity types, taking
any two types at a time, the male marriage premium in the higher productiv-
ity group is never higher than the one in the lower productivity group. This
generalisation will be key for our empirical analysis below, but for now Figure
1 illustrates a particular equilibrium marriage premium pattern, with only two
types.
3 Empirical evidence
Proposition 1 offers clear predictions about the ranking of marriage premia
across men of different productivity. We test this by estimating the marriage
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premia for a heterogeneous male workforce. We use education as proxy for
productivity, and estimate the marriage premium by regressing income on mar-
ital status, controlling for a range of other factors and using fixed effects. By
applying the within-transformation we sweep out time-invariant individual het-
erogeneity, including within-educational group productivity differences.
China appears to be a suitable choice: the importance of material poses-
sions (including wage) for male success in the marriage market is well doc-
umented, while the gender imbalance lends itself to testing our model with
one-sided heterogeneity. We use data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition
Survey (CHNS), a longitudinal panel data set established to examine a range
of economic, sociological, demographic and health questions. The survey covers
Chinese households from nine regions that cover approximately 56% of the total
Chinese population, with data collected in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004,
2006, 2009, 2011 and 2015.
The data contains information on income, education, marital status, em-
ployment and health, among others. The original survey covered around 19,000
individuals, while the most recent covered 30,000, and follow-up levels are high.
We focus on men between ages of 18 and 60, who are either single or in their first
marriage, and who are working full time. After the deletion of missing data,
this provides a final sample of 9,461 individuals, giving 27,404 observations. We
group individuals according to their education status. The three groups are
1) No qualifications/completed primary education (low productivity), 2) High
school leavers qualifications (medium productivity), and 3) Post high school
leavers qualifications (high productivity).
The key outcome variable is income. In the CHNS individuals report their
total net individual income, which is then adjusted, according to CPI, to 2015
prices. We use the log of this variable, and include controls for age, employment
type (self-employed, the reference category, employed, temporarily employed,
other types of employment), sector of employment (government sector, reference
category, state sector, a collective, a family farm, the private sector or another
sector), health status and wave dummies. Summary statistics for the full sample
and each sub-sample are given in Table 1; note that as qualification increases
the average log of income increases.
We estimate the marriage premium for each sample using fixed effects, which
controls for unobservable heterogeneity and also removes all time invariant vari-
ables, such as education status, from the model. We follow Cornwell and Rupert
(1995) and consider a wage equation of the form:
ln(wit) = βMit + γ
′Xit + αi + εit,
where the dependent variable is the log of income, Mit is an indicator showing
marital status, and Xit is a vector of control variables. In turn, αi captures time-
invariant individual heterogeneity and εit is the standard idiosyncratic error
6
Table 1: Summary statistics
Full Sample Primary/no qual High School Post-High School
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Log Income 9.000 8.463 8.933 9.685
(1.243) (1.198) (1.209) (1.071)
Married 0.895 0.926 0.897 0.862
(0.307) (0.262) (0.304) (0.345)
Age 40.325 45.267 39.226 39.125
(10.625) (10.308) (10.393) (10.309)
Employed 0.446 0.216 0.382 0.846
(0.497) (0.412) (0.486) (0.361)
Self Employed 0.473 0.706 0.528 0.097
(0.499) (0.456) (0.499) (0.297)
Temp Employed 0.055 0.055 0.063 0.031
(0.228) (0.228) (0.244) (0.173)
Other Employment 0.015 0.008 0.015 0.023
(0.122) (0.087) (0.120) (0.150)
Government Sector 0.177 0.074 0.141 0.378
(0.382) (0.262) (0.348) (0.485)
State Sector 0.182 0.103 0.150 0.346
(0.386) (0.304) (0.357) (0.476)
Collective 0.311 0.514 0.329 0.072
(0.463) (0.500) (0.470) (0.259)
Family Farm 0.132 0.180 0.156 0.016
(0.338) (0.384) (0.363) (0.124)
Private Sector 0.160 0.098 0.185 0.142
(0.367) (0.297) (0.389) (0.349)
Other Sector 0.038 0.031 0.038 0.046
(0.192) (0.173) (0.191) (0.209)
Good Health 0.294 0.383 0.307 0.176
(0.456) (0.486) (0.461) (0.381)
Observations 27404 5079 16701 5624
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Table 2: Results
Full Sample Primary/no qual High School Post-High School
Married 0.209∗∗∗ 0.278∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(4.97) (1.67) (3.85) (2.38)
Employee 0.302∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.0723
(10.75) (5.99) (9.53) (1.05)
Temp emp 0.0755∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.103∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗
(1.92) (2.49) (2.18) (-2.68)
Other emp 0.128∗ 0.0321 0.0648 0.0831
(1.89) (0.12) (0.72) (0.87)
State Sector 0.170∗∗∗ 0.0372 0.130∗∗∗ 0.0736∗
(7.58) (0.54) (4.35) (1.80)
Collective 0.0637∗∗ 0.0572 0.0259 -0.000598
(2.01) (0.67) (0.65) (-0.01)
Fam farm -0.180∗∗∗ -0.0900 -0.113∗ -0.478∗∗∗
(-3.82) (-0.76) (-1.87) (-2.88)
Private 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0631 0.178∗∗∗ -0.0751
(2.69) (0.52) (3.32) (-1.07)
Other sec 0.116∗∗ 0.171 0.179∗∗∗ -0.103
(2.23) (1.17) (2.63) (-1.15)
Good health 0.0819∗∗∗ 0.0640 0.0944∗∗ 0.0996∗∗
(2.97) (1.21) (2.49) (2.37)
age 31-40 0.153∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.0280
(5.03) (3.78) (3.46) (0.58)
age 41-50 0.150∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.0987 -0.0126
(3.27) (3.75) (1.64) (-0.17)
age 51-60 -0.0167 0.423∗∗ -0.0842 -0.135
(-0.26) (2.43) (-0.98) (-1.38)
Constant 9.717∗∗∗ 8.941∗∗∗ 9.670∗∗∗ 10.58∗∗∗
(109.47) (28.33) (84.73) (77.93)
N 27,404 5,079 16,701 5,624
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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term. For a positive marriage premium, the estimate of β must be positive and
significant.
We estimated the equation above for the full sample and for each education
category. Table 2 contains our empirical findings.
The results support our theoretical predictions. In particular, the first row
of Table 2 shows that the marriage premium is positive and highly significant for
the whole sample, and each sub-group has a positive and significant marriage
premium. Furthermore, the estimate for the group with primary education/no
qualifications is the largest (and significant at the 10% level of significance),
with the size of the estimate falling as the level of education increases.
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